By Sloj S. Litofe  

In my September 16 article entitled, "Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Museveni, and Kagame: Two Vicious Tribal Dictators, Sources of Instability in the Great Lakes Region," I focused on three ideas.

The first idea started that the "so-called" August 2, 1998, Banyamulege II rebellion was not a rebellion as Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, Paul Kagame, Vice President of Rwanda, and the international media wanted us to believe, but it was, unquestionably, a well-planned invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo --a sovereign United Nations member-- by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in order to remove Kabila, the self-proclaimed President of the Democratic Republic of Congo who had become a real obstacle to Museveni's and Kagame's tribal hegemonic ambition in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Secondly, I asserted that without minimizing the validity of other alternative explanations or causes of today Congo's crisis (e.g. internal, regional, and international) (1), Museveni's, Kagame's, and Tustsi extremists' conspiracy to create a Tutsi political Dynasty in the Great Lakes Region must be viewed as the primary cause of today Congo's crisis.

How Yoweri Museveni came to power in Uganda; how Paul Kagame became Rwanda's "strongman"; how Pierre Buyoya became Burundi's President; and how James Kabarehe, Bizma Karaha, and Deogratias Bugera were promoted to high government positions in the Democratic Republic of Congo corroborates Tutsi's conspiracy thesis.

To my readers who were highly skeptical of the Tutsi extremists' conspiracy thesis, I urged them to read the document related to Tutsi International Power that I posted to both Forum Congo2000 and Forum Congonline on September 24. For those of you who did not have the opportunity to read it, here is its integrality:

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING (KIGALI)

To the attention of T.I.P. members in Great Lakes Region

Ref: Urgent and appropriate measure of the safeguard of our project

When we met in Kisoro (Uganda) from 03 to 05 June 1997 just after our victory which led to the fall of dictator Mobutu, we underlined the necessity to strengthen our undertaking by posting our best human resources in services dealing with security, economics, finance and administration, particularly in the Province of North Kivu which is an integral part of our homeland. This strategy is supposed to make easy our control of the Democratic Republic of Congo and to consolidate further our influence in the Great Lakes Region.

In fact, Zaire was the missing link in ensuring that we attain total power control in the Indian basin with the exception of Kenya and Tanzania where power is still in the hands of our enemies. However, Kenya will not be able to resist for a long time given the internal pressures exerted by our Ugandan, Ethiopian and Eritrean brothers who are determined to continue until victory is obtained.

As far as Tanzania is concerned, our Masai brothers have not yet gained enough political and military influence to start a liberation struggle as have done our friends in Kenya. We must analyze together what should be done to stop Mwalimu Nyerere who, clearly, intends to sabotage our hegemonic plans and who is actively seeking the removal of our Burundian brother, Major Buyoya. And furthermore, the tanzanian government openly supports Nyangoma and the INTERAHAMWE of General Bizimungu who are Responsible for genocide in Burundi and Rwanda.

While waiting for concrete proposals that will be submitted for approval at Mbarara (Uganda) meeting, to be held from 17 to 19 July 1997, we must remind the Team Leaders from the Democratic Republic of Congo to be vigilant day and night because Kabila is Lumumbist. And you well know that Lumumbists are Nationalists. They might one day rebel against us and chase us from Congo. Congolese are like Hutus. Tey are ungrateful.

That is why we strongly ask the Gouvernor of North Kivu, Kanyamuhanga Gafungi and our brothers Ngezayo Albert and Rwakabuba Shinga respectively President and Vice-President of TIP (team Leaders in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to closely work and support RPA and NRA soldiers stationed in the Democratic Republic of Congo so as to ensure the protection of our Representatives (Douglas Bugera and Bizima Karaha) witin the government.

Our soldiers must by all means neutralize the MAI MAI and INTERAHAMWE who have become a thorn for the security of our farmers in the Masisi region. We run a risk of colluting with Kabila regime to refuse the occupation of the Masisi region. The governor of North Kivu, Kanyamuanga gafundi expressed these same fears in his report.

Finally, we would like to inform you that some of our friends have began to turn their back against us and to discredit us. They call us war-mongers? and even genociders?. They are threatening to withdraw their support to us. We must urgently find strategies to deal with this situation.

Long life to TIP

N.B: TUTSI INTERNATIONAL POWER is now extended to Ethiopia and Eritrea and should include Sudan after its liberation by John Garang.

Signed: For the current TIP Chairman

(RPF-Team-Rwanda)

Major-Doctor Ndahiro

COUNSELOR

Although it is known that Tutsi of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi do not necessarily constitute a coherent bloc, that they have distinct interests, and that may or may not forcibly consider themselves to be brothers and/or sisters, either among themselves, or with the Masai people, this document is extremely revealing as far as Tutsi extremists' conspiracy thesis is concerned.

In order to materialize this tribal hegemonic conspiracy in the Great Lakes Region, Museveni, Kagame, and other Tutsi extremists are playing three different cards: the genocide card, the Jewish persecution card, and the real politick card.

First, the genocide card refers to Tutsi extremists maximizing on the international community outrage vis-a-vis Hutu extremists responsible for the 1994 genocide of over 500,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates. The concept of "genocide" has ever since become powerful propaganda. Museveni, Kagame, and Tutsi extremists are effectively using the concept of "genocide" to cover up both their tribal hegemonic ambitions in the Great Lakes Region, and the savage killings and terrors that they themselves organized against thousands of innocent people in Congo (see Ogen Kevin, "Congolese people bigger than Museveni, Kagame, Mugabe," in AfricaNews, October 13, 1998; also, Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda Washington, "Today we are raising the red flag on genocide a second time," in Marekinc, October 14, 1998).

Now, the international community has realized that Tutsi extremists are as criminal as their Hutu extremist compatriots are due to the following:

a/ the refusal of Bizima Karaha (former Kabila's foreign minister) and his Ugandan and Rwandan partners to cooperate with the United Nations investigations on the massacre and/or genocide of over 230,000 Hutu refugees during the ADFL offensive in the Congo to topple Marshal Mobutu;

b/ the August 24, 1998, massacre of 633 people, among whom were priests and nuns in South Kivu, by Museveni's and Kagame's troops;

c/ the report from Congo that HIV positive Kagame's Tutsi soldiers are daily raping thousands of defenseless Congolese women (see Hassan Bandu Zziwa, "Congo women pay the price of war," in Africanews, October 8, 1998; also Ogen Kevin, "Death on the River Congo," in Africanews, October 6, 1998).

Given these acts of mass killings, terrorism, vandalism and rapes perpetrated by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in DRC, Tutsi extremists' "genocide card" has almost lost all its international propaganda power.

The persecution card plays as follows: they attempt to attract World sympathy vis--vis Tutsis, conserve their victimhood status, and in turn help Tutsi extremists continue hiding their tribal hegemonic ambition in the Great Lakes Region. That is, Tutsi extremists are now actively comparing the 1994 genocide to the Jewish holocaust (see Yusuf Bangura, "Museveni, Kagame blew up golden chance in Congo," in AfricaNews, September 1, 1998; also, Anastase's article in Marekinc Letter to Editors of September 24, in response to my September 19 article). This comparison is not only silly, but it is disturbing and insulting to the Jewish community. To my knowledge, in the Jewish struggle for survival and self-determination, the Jews have never practiced genocide and have never exhibited savage and barbaric behavior like Tutsi extremists in eastern Congo.

Tutsi extremists strategy name the "real politick card," refers to Uganda's and Rwanda's legitimate right to protect their so-called "security interests." This allows Museveni and Kagame to violate the Cairo Declaration of the 1964 on "Territorial Inviolability of National boundaries as inherited at independence." Their aggression against Congo is literally ignored.

Ironically, the "real politick card" strategy does not tell us how Museveni's and Kagame's occupation of Congo territory, terrorism, vandalism, barbarism, and rapes of Congolese women solves centuries of virulent Tutsi-Hutu's conflicts within Rwanda and Burundi. Or, how their presence in Congo will oblige Museveni open up his dictatorial regime to multi-parties democracy, and force him to negotiate directly with his own rebels.

Equipped with these three strategies (e.g., the genocide card, the Jewish persecution card, and the real politick card), Museveni, Kagame, and Tutsi extremists have used four strategies to materialize their dream in Congo: the secession, the camouflage, the deception, and the delay.

The cession refers to Museveni's and Kagame's proclamation of the "Republique Autonome du Sud Kivu" after their aggression of August 2, 1998. Museveni and Kagame believed the rest of Congo would fall victim to a "domino effect" with more secession of the Congo's provinces governed by warmongers. The Democratic Republic of Congo would then disintegrate leaving the province of Kivu at Uganda's and Rwanda's mercy. They could then annex the Kivu to their projected confederation of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. It failed.

Because secession failed, Museveni and Kagame are now attempting the "camouflage" strategy. Their ideals is to fool the Congolese people and the international community by placing well known Congolese faces (e.g., Professor Wamba Dia Wamba, Jacques Depelchin, Arthur Zaidi Ngoma, Lunda Bululu, etc) in the forefront of the so-called Banyamulenge's II rebellion, allowing Museveni, Kagame, Kabarehe, Karaha, Bugera, Moise Nyarugabo, and their external lobbies play cards behind the scene.

However, reports from eastern Congo regarding Congolese reluctance and/or refusal to cooperate with Museveni's and Kagame's troops in eastern Congo suggest that Museveni's and Kagame's "camouflage" strategy is now well known by the majority of Congolese people.

Faced with this reality, Museveni and Kagame now resort to two new strategies: the deception and the delay.

"The deception" refers to Kagame's consistent and systematic lies regarding the presence of Rwanda's troops in Congo. Museveni and Kagame expect the Congo's aggression to be resolved either peacefully or militarily, and then, due to Kagame's denial of their presence, thousands of Tutsi fighters already in Congo will ipso facto be officially converted into Banyarwanda and/or Banyamulenge of Kivu's regions. They will be officially recognized as Congolese, and as such keep Museveni's, Kagame's, and Tutsi extremists' tribal hegemonic ambition alive.

Congruently, Museveni, Kagame, and Tutsi extremists use of "the delay strategy", they are convinced that as time passes, international and domestic pressures exercised on Kabila's principal military allies notably: Edouardo Dos Santos, the Angola's President; Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe's President; and Sam Nujoma, the Namibia's President, will oblige these leaders to withdraw their troops from Congo.

The withdrawal of Kabila's military allies will clear the way for Museveni's troops that have already received Uganda's parliamentary blessing to stay in Congo. Furthermore, although Kagame denies their presence in Congo, thousands of Tutsi Rwanda fighters will join Museveni soldiers advancing Museveni's, Kagame's, and Tutsi extremists tribal hegemonic ambition in the Congo.

In addition to rejecting the rebellion thesis, and affirming the Tutsi extremist conspiracy thesis, I finally advanced the idea that in order to secure peace, security, stability, and economic progress in the Great Lakes Region, leaders from Uganda's, Rwanda's, Burundi's, and Congo's need to cultivate Mandela's and De Klerk's spirit. That is, politicians and scholars from these countries need to develop the spirit of forgiveness, tolerance, and national reconciliation. From this perspective, Museveni must talk and reconcile with Uganda's rebels; Kagame must talk and reconcile with Rwanda's rebels; Buyoya must talk and reconcile with Burundi's rebels; and President Laurent Kabila must talk and reconcile with Tshisekedi, Wamba dia Wamba, Olenga Nkoy, and other Congo's political parties and civil societies' leaders.

Given these arguments, how could we effectively end Museveni's and Kagame's misadventure in Congo? There remains two possible solutions: a peaceful negotiation or the used of military force.

A. Peaceful Negotiations

It is not too late for President Kabila to demonstrate to Congolese people and the international community that he is a "Mzee," meaning a respectable "Old, Wise African Man." Indeed, Mzee could peacefully end Museveni's and Kagame's terrorism, barbarism, and vandalism in Congo by negotiating with Professor Wamba Dia Wamba, and transforming his "Onion system" into a "Government of National Unity," which will include Tshisekedi WA Mulumba, Olenga Nkoy, and representatives of Congo's other political parties, and civil society leaders.

A deal such as this holds three advantages. First, it will end eastern Congo's hostilities, saving millions of lives; prevents rapes and the transmission of HIV; terminate looting and incalculable suffering of innocent Congolese citizens. Secondly, it promotes the "Government of National Unity" with Kabila incorporating officially recognized leaders of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) notably: Wamba Dia Wamba, Jacques Deplchin, Lunda Bululu, and Zaidi Ngoma. This renders Museveni's and Kagame's claims regarding their "real politick card" irrelevant. Through Wamba Dia Wamba and his associates, Museveni and Kagame are reassured of the safeguard of Uganda's and Rwanda's "real politick card" in Congo, and are obliged to withdraw their troops from Congo territory. Finally, by incorporating Tshisekedi, Olengakoy and many other civil society representatives in a "Government of National Unity," Kabila's critics regarding the Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo becomes irrelevant.

Basically, in order to end the political distraction, and its fierce socioeconomic consequences endured by innocent Congolese, it is vital that: a/ Mzee Kabila retain his Presidency until the organization of free, fair, and democratic elections; b/ Tshisekedi assumes the position of Prime Minister; c/ Wamba Dia Wamba becomes the deputy Prime Minister and minister of Home Affaire; d/ Jose Olengakoy becomes deputy Prime minister and minister of international cooperation; e/ and General Likulia Bolongo, deputy Prime Minister and minister of Defence.

Mutual forgiveness, philosophical tolerance, national reconciliation, and power sharing summarizes the core principles of the "Government of National Unity".

The most potent of the "Government of National Unity's" attribute lies on the avoidance of accumulated power. Too much authority in the hand of either a single person or a small group undermines the everlasting peace, security, stability, and economic progress of the Democratic Republic of Congo. As Montesquieu states:

"When the Legislative and Executive powers are united in the same person or body, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise less the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor" (Montesquieu, cited by Madison, op. Cit., p. 303).

Mobutu's "Onion System" exemplifies Montesquieu's findings. Under Mobutu era's, tyranny was largely practiced through mass torturing, arbitrary arrests, false imprisonment, property confiscation, political exiling, media censorship, and more importantly denying of the freedom of speech, the freedom of affiliation, and the exacerbation of many other human rights abuses (Pierre Yambuya, 1991; Nguz Karl-I-Bond, 1982; and Conference Nationale Souveraine, "Rapport de la Commission des Biens Mal Acquis", 1992).

An objevtive reading of Tshisekedi's and Wamba Dia Wamba's grievances regarding Kabila's dictatorship, corruption, nepotism and/or the Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the state-sponsored terrorism and/or xenophobia against the Banyamulenge, clearly confirms Madison's assertion that:

"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" (James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 47, p. 301).

That is to say, a careful interpretation of Tshisekedi's and Wamba Dia Wamba's memorandums demonstrate that under Mzee's regime, "Apres Mobutu = Avant Mobutu," -- Mobutu's "Onion system" lives!

That why, it is essential for Mzee Kabila to hear the Congolese's cries, and creates a "Government of National Unity." If Mzee have done this when he come to power on May 17, 1997, Museveni and Kagame would not have succeeded with their evil aggression, which has plunged thousands of Congolese families into a misery that eclipses even Mubutu's legacy.

In light of Congolese sufferings, the "Government of National Unity" must be a government constituted by technocrats i.e., innovative citizens able to: a/ appreciate the strength of our ethnic diversity; b/provide leadership through courage, discipline, honesty, modesty, and vision; c/ cultivate friendly business environment, creating job opportunities.

Further, it must be a government capable of creating an interdisciplinary "Constitutional Taskforce" that will be in charge of drafting the new constitution. This new Constitution must clearly establish the principles of popular sovereignty, separation of power, freedom and tolerance, proportional and equal representation, universal suffrage, self-management of local entities, social & economic equality.

These principles are developed in my doctoral dissertation, entitled, "Ethnicity and Modern Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Case of Zaire: 1965-1995."

Finally, it must be a government capable of effectively preparing local elections (i.e., elections of mayors for both urban and rural zones, and their council members), provincial elections (i.e., elections of governors and provincial council members), national elections (i.e., elections of member of the legislature), and finally, the organization of a presidential election. The presidential election must come after the stabilizing and the re-energizing of Congo's territorial management, and not before.

As we can see, there exists no significant obstacle preventing Mzee Kabila from establishing the "Government of National Unity." Kabila's principal military allies: Edouardo Dos Santos, the Angola's President; Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe's President, and Sam Nujoma, the Namibia's President, will be Congolese's "Heroes," assuming they can convince Mzee Kabila to materialize this Congolese dream of a fair and just society.

B. Militarily

As long as Museveni and Kagame continue to consider Congo's territory their "battlefield," Uganda and Rwanda will never withdraw from Congo.

The most effective way to militarily end Museveni's and Kagame's terrorism, barbarism, and vandalism in Congo, is to convince Congo's military allies, notably Dos Santos, Mugabe, and Nujoma, relocate the battlefield to Uganda and Rwanda. This means that Kabila's allies must:

Primo, disregard United Nations, OAU, United States, France, Belgium and other Western allies' opinions. We should take note that, if Congo's military allies had listened to Western influences, then Uganda and Rwanda would be ruling Kinshasa, today.

Secundo, give a firm ultimatum to Uganda and Rwanda to immediately withdraw from Congo. Give them 48 hours.

Tercio, if Uganda and Rwanda ignore the allies' ultimatum, proceed to a simultaneous air and ground attack of both Uganda's and Rwanda's Capitols, and strategic military targets. After one or two days of combat within Uganda and Rwanda, international powers, Uganda's and Rwanda's people, will force Museveni and Kagame to withdraw their troops from Congo. That will be the end of it! In the alternative, Museveni, Kagame, and Tutsi extremists will never leave Congo. They are determined to fight until their brothers rule Congo. Make no mistake about this.

When the bandit forces exit Congo, Kabila must establish the "Government of National Unity," which will elevate Congo to a multi-party democracy, and foster mutual forgiveness, philosophical tolerance, national reconciliation, power sharing, and economic progress.

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(1) See, Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba "Memorandum sur la Crise Congolaise" point 4, in Forum Congo2000, October 7, 1998; and also Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, "Memorandum des Forces de L'Opposition Democratique de la RDC" point A, in Fourm Congo2000, Setember22, 1998)

*NB: My second paper that will focus on the role of The United States and its Western allies in the Congo's crisis still to come.

*Silika@Almaak.usc.edu

Sloj S. Litofe