| Congo |
 |
| Sloj S. Litofe |
|
|
|
|
How to Effectively End Museveni's and
Kagame's Terrorism, Barbarism, and Vandalism in the Democratic Republic of Congo?
Sloj S. Litofe
In my September 16 article entitled, "Conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Museveni, and Kagame: Two Vicious Tribal Dictators,
Sources of Instability in the Great Lakes Region," I focused on three
ideas.
The first idea started that the "so-called" August 2, 1998,
Banyamulege II rebellion was not a rebellion as Yoweri Museveni, President
of Uganda, and Paul Kagame, Vice President of Rwanda and the international
media wanted us to believe, but it was, unquestionably, a well-planned
invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo --a sovereign United Nations
member-- by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in order to remove Kabila, the
self-proclaimed President of the Democratic Republic of Congo who had
become a real obstacle to Museveni's and Kagame's tribal hegemonic
ambition in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Secondly, I asserted that without minimizing the validity of other
alternative explanations or causes of today Congo's crisis (e.g.
internal, regional, and international) (1), Museveni's, Kagame's, and
Tustsi extremists' conspiracy to create a Tutsi political Dynasty in the
Great Lakes Region must be viewed as the primary cause of today Congo's
crisis.
How Yoweri Museveni came to power in Uganda; how Paul Kagame became
Rwanda's "strongman"; how Pierre Buyoya became Burundi's President; and
how James Kabarehe, Bizma Karaha, and Deogratias Bugera were promoted to
high government positions in the Democratic Republic of Congo corroborates
Tutsi's conspiracy thesis.
To my readers who were highly skeptical of the Tutsi extremists'
conspiracy thesis, I urged them to read the document related to Tutsi
International Power that I posted to both Forum Congo2000 and Forum
Congonline on September 24. For those of you who did not have the
opportunity to read it, here is its integrality:
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC PLANNING (KIGALI)
To the attention of T.I.P. members in Great Lakes Region
Ref: Urgent and appropriate measure of the safeguard of our project
When we met in Kisoro (Uganda) from 03 to 05 June 1997 just after our
victory which led to the fall of dictator Mobutu, we underlined the
necessity to strengthen our undertaking by posting our best human
resources in services dealing with security, economics, finance and
administration, particularly in the Province of North Kivu which is an
integral part of our homeland. This strategy is supposed to make easy
our control of the Democratic Republic of Congo and to consolidate
further our influence in the Great Lakes Region.
In fact, Zaire was the missing link in ensuring that we attain total
power control in the Indian basin with the exception of Kenya and
Tanzania where power is still in the hands of our enemies. However,
Kenya will not be able to resist for a long time given the internal
pressures exerted by our Ugandan, Ethiopian and Eritrean brothers who
are determined to continue until victory is obtained.
As far as Tanzania is concerned, our Masai brothers have not yet gained
enough political and military influence to start a liberation struggle
as have done our friends in Kenya. We must analyze together what should
be done to stop Mwalimu Nyerere who, clearly, intends to sabotage our
hegemonic plans and who is actively seeking the removal of our Burundian
brother, Major Buyoya. And furthermore, the tanzanian government openly
supports Nyangoma and the INTERAHAMWE of General Bizimungu who are
Responsible for genocide in Burundi and Rwanda.
While waiting for concrete proposals that will be submitted for approval
at Mbarara (Uganda) meeting, to be held from 17 to 19 July 1997, we
must remind the Team Leaders from the Democratic Republic of Congo to be
vigilant day and night because Kabila is Lumumbist. And you well know
that Lumumbists are Nationalists. They might one day rebel against us
and chase us from Congo. Congolese are like Hutus. Tey are ungrateful.
That is why we strongly ask the Gouvernor of North Kivu, Kanyamuhanga
Gafungi and our brothers Ngezayo Albert and Rwakabuba Shinga
respectively President and Vice-President of TIP (team Leaders in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, to closely work and support RPA and NRA
soldiers stationed in the Democratic Republic of Congo so as to ensure
the protection of our Representatives (Douglas Bugera and Bizima Karaha)
witin the government.
Our soldiers must by all means neutralize the MAI MAI and INTERAHAMWE
who have become a thorn for the security of our farmers in the Masisi
region. We run a risk of colluting with Kabila regime to refuse the
occupation of the Masisi region. The governor of North Kivu,
Kanyamuanga gafundi expressed these same fears in his report.
Finally, we would like to inform you that some of our friends have began
to turn their back against us and to discredit us. They call us
war-mongers? and even genociders?. They are threatening to withdraw
their support to us. We must urgently find strategies to deal with this
situation.
Long life to TIP
N.B: TUTSI INTERNATIONAL POWER is now extended to Ethiopia and Eritrea
and should include Sudan after its liberation by John Garang.
Signed: For the current TIP Chairman
(RPF-Team-Rwanda)
Major-Doctor Ndahiro
COUNSELOR
Although it is known that Tutsi of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi do
not necessarily constitute a coherent bloc, that they have distinct
interests, and that may or may not forcibly consider themselves to be
brothers and/or sisters, either among themselves, or with the Masai
people, this document is extremely revealing as far as Tutsi extremists'
conspiracy thesis is concerned.
In order to materialize this tribal hegemonic conspiracy in the
Great Lakes Region, Museveni, Kagame, and other Tutsi extremists are
playing three different cards: the genocide card, the Jewish persecution
card, and the real politick card.
First, the genocide card refers to Tutsi extremists maximizing on
the international community outrage vis-a-vis Hutu extremists responsible
for the 1994 genocide of over 500,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates. The
concept of "genocide" has ever since become powerful propaganda. Museveni,
Kagame, and Tutsi extremists are effectively using the concept of
"genocide" to cover up both their tribal hegemonic ambitions in the Great
Lakes Region, and the savage killings and terrors that they themselves
organized against thousands of innocent people in Congo (see Ogen Kevin,
"Congolese people bigger than Museveni, Kagame, Mugabe," in AfricaNews,
October 13, 1998; also, Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda
Washington, "Today we are raising the red flag on genocide a second time,"
in Marekinc, October 14, 1998).
Now, the international community has realized that Tutsi
extremists are as criminal as their Hutu extremist compatriots are due to
the following:
a/ the refusal of Bizima Karaha (former Kabila's foreign minister) and his
Ugandan and Rwandan partners to cooperate with the United Nations
investigations on the massacre and/or genocide of over 230,000 Hutu
refugees during the ADFL offensive in the Congo to topple Marshal Mobutu;
b/ the August 24, 1998, massacre of 633 people, among whom were priests
and nuns in South Kivu, by Museveni's and Kagame's troops;
c/ the report from Congo that HIV positive Kagame's Tutsi soldiers are
daily raping thousands of defenseless Congolese women (see Hassan Bandu
Zziwa, "Congo women pay the price of war," in Africanews, October 8, 1998;
also Ogen Kevin, "Death on the River Congo," in Africanews, October 6,
1998).
Given these acts of mass killings, terrorism, vandalism and rapes
perpetrated by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in DRC, Tutsi extremists'
"genocide card" has almost lost all its international propaganda power.
The persecution card plays as follows: they attempt to attract
World sympathy vis--vis Tutsis, conserve their victimhood status, and in
turn help Tutsi extremists continue hiding their tribal hegemonic ambition
in the Great Lakes Region. That is, Tutsi extremists are now actively
comparing the 1994 genocide to the Jewish holocaust (see Yusuf Bangura,
"Museveni, Kagame blew up golden chance in Congo," in AfricaNews,
September 1, 1998; also, Anastase's article in Marekinc Letter to Editors
of September 24, in response to my September 19 article). This comparison
is not only silly, but it is disturbing and insulting to the Jewish
community. To my knowledge, in the Jewish struggle for survival and
self-determination, the Jews have never practiced genocide and have never
exhibited savage and barbaric behavior like Tutsi extremists in eastern
Congo.
Tutsi extremists strategy name the "real politick card,"
refers to
Uganda's and Rwanda's legitimate right to protect their so-called
"security interests." This allows Museveni and Kagame to violate the Cairo
Declaration of the 1964 on "Territorial Inviolability of National
boundaries as inherited at independence." Their aggression against Congo
is literally ignored.
Ironically, the "real politick card" strategy does not tell
us how
Museveni's and Kagame's occupation of Congo territory, terrorism,
vandalism, barbarism, and rapes of Congolese women solves centuries of
virulent Tutsi-Hutu's conflicts within Rwanda and Burundi. Or, how their
presence in Congo will oblige Museveni open up his dictatorial regime to
multi-parties democracy, and force him to negotiate directly with his own
rebels.
Equipped with these three strategies (e.g., the genocide card, the
Jewish persecution card, and the real politick card), Museveni, Kagame,
and Tutsi extremists have used four strategies to materialize their dream
in Congo: the secession, the camouflage, the deception, and the delay.
The cession refers to Museveni's and Kagame's proclamation of the
"Republique Autonome du Sud Kivu" after their aggression of August 2,
1998. Museveni and Kagame believed the rest of Congo would fall victim to
a "domino effect" with more secession of the Congo's provinces governed by
warmongers. The Democratic Republic of Congo would then disintegrate
leaving the province of Kivu at Uganda's and Rwanda's mercy. They could
then annex the Kivu to their projected confederation of Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi. It failed.
Because secession failed, Museveni and Kagame are now attempting
the "camouflage" strategy. Their ideals is to fool the Congolese people
and the international community by placing well known Congolese faces
(e.g., Professor Wamba Dia Wamba, Jacques Depelchin, Arthur Zaidi Ngoma,
Lunda Bululu, etc) in the forefront of the so-called Banyamulenge's II
rebellion, allowing Museveni, Kagame, Kabarehe, Karaha, Bugera, Moise
Nyarugabo, and their external lobbies play cards behind the scene.
However, reports from eastern Congo regarding Congolese reluctance
and/or refusal to cooperate with Museveni's and Kagame's troops in eastern
Congo suggest that Museveni's and Kagame's "camouflage" strategy is now
well known by the majority of Congolese people.
Faced with this reality, Museveni and Kagame now resort to two new
strategies: the deception and the delay.
"The deception" refers to Kagame's consistent and systematic
lies
regarding the presence of Rwanda's troops in Congo. Museveni and Kagame
expect the Congo's aggression to be resolved either peacefully or
militarily, and then, due to Kagame's denial of their presence, thousands
of Tutsi fighters already in Congo will ipso facto be officially converted
into Banyarwanda and/or Banyamulenge of Kivu's regions. They will be
officially recognized as Congolese, and as such keep Museveni's, Kagame's,
and Tutsi extremists' tribal hegemonic ambition alive.
Congruently, Museveni, Kagame, and Tutsi extremists use of "the
delay strategy", they are convinced that as time passes, international and
domestic pressures exercised on Kabila's principal military allies
notably: Edouardo Dos Santos, the Angola's President; Robert Mugabe, the
Zimbabwe's President; and Sam Nujoma, the Namibia's President, will oblige
these leaders to withdraw their troops from Congo.
The withdrawal of Kabila's military allies will clear the way for
Museveni's troops that have already received Uganda's parliamentary
blessing to stay in Congo. Furthermore, although Kagame denies their
presence in Congo, thousands of Tutsi Rwanda fighters will join Museveni
soldiers advancing Museveni's, Kagame's, and Tutsi extremists tribal
hegemonic ambition in the Congo.
In addition to rejecting the rebellion thesis, and affirming the
Tutsi extremist conspiracy thesis, I finally advanced the idea that in
order to secure peace, security, stability, and economic progress in the
Great Lakes Region, leaders from Uganda's, Rwanda's, Burundi's, and
Congo's need to cultivate Mandela's and De Klerk's spirit. That is,
politicians and scholars from these countries need to develop the spirit
of forgiveness, tolerance, and national reconciliation. From this
perspective, Museveni must talk and reconcile with Uganda's rebels; Kagame
must talk and reconcile with Rwanda's rebels; Buyoya must talk and
reconcile with Burundi's rebels; and President Laurent Kabila must talk
and reconcile with Tshisekedi, Wamba dia Wamba, Olenga Nkoy, and other
Congo's political parties and civil societies' leaders.
Given these arguments, how could we effectively end Museveni's
and Kagame's misadventure in Congo? There remains two possible solutions:
a peaceful negotiation or the used of military force.
A. Peaceful Negotiations
It is not too late for President Kabila to demonstrate to
Congolese people and the international community that he is a "Mzee,"
meaning a respectable "Old, Wise African Man." Indeed, Mzee could
peacefully end Museveni's and Kagame's terrorism, barbarism, and vandalism
in Congo by negotiating with Professor Wamba Dia Wamba, and transforming
his "Onion system" into a "Government of National Unity," which will
include Tshisekedi WA Mulumba, Olenga Nkoy, and representatives of Congo's
other political parties, and civil society leaders.
A deal such as this holds three advantages. First, it will end
eastern Congo's hostilities, saving millions of lives; prevents rapes and
the transmission of HIV; terminate looting and incalculable suffering of
innocent Congolese citizens. Secondly, it promotes the "Government of
National Unity" with Kabila incorporating officially recognized leaders of
the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) notably: Wamba Dia Wamba, Jacques
Deplchin, Lunda Bululu, and Zaidi Ngoma. This renders Museveni's and
Kagame's claims regarding their "real politick card" irrelevant. Through
Wamba Dia Wamba and his associates, Museveni and Kagame are reassured of
the safeguard of Uganda's and Rwanda's "real politick card" in Congo, and
are obliged to withdraw their troops from Congo territory. Finally, by
incorporating Tshisekedi, Olengakoy and many other civil society
representatives in a "Government of National Unity," Kabila's critics
regarding the Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo becomes
irrelevant.
Basically, in order to end the political distraction, and its
fierce socioeconomic consequences endured by innocent Congolese, it is
vital that: a/ Mzee Kabila retain his Presidency until the organization of
free, fair, and democratic elections; b/ Tshisekedi assumes
the position of Prime Minister; c/ Wamba Dia Wamba becomes the deputy
Prime Minister and minister of Home Affaire; d/ Jose Olengakoy becomes
deputy Prime minister and minister of international cooperation; e/ and
General Likulia Bolongo, deputy Prime Minister and minister of Defence.
Mutual forgiveness, philosophical tolerance, national reconciliation, and
power sharing summarizes the core principles of the "Government of
National Unity".
The most potent of the "Government of National Unity's"
attribute
lies on the avoidance of accumulated power. Too much authority in the hand
of either a single person or a small group undermines the everlasting
peace, security, stability, and economic progress of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. As Montesquieu states:
"When the Legislative and Executive powers are united in the same
person or body, there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise
less the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute
them in a tyrannical manner. Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the
violence of an oppressor" (Montesquieu, cited by Madison, op. Cit., p.
303).
Mobutu's "Onion System" exemplifies Montesquieu's findings.
Under
Mobutu era's, tyranny was largely practiced through mass torturing,
arbitrary arrests, false imprisonment, property confiscation, political
exiling, media censorship, and more importantly denying of the freedom of
speech, the freedom of affiliation, and the exacerbation of many other
human rights abuses (Pierre Yambuya, 1991; Nguz Karl-I-Bond, 1982; and
Conference Nationale Souveraine, "Rapport de la Commission des Biens Mal
Acquis", 1992).
An objevtive reading of Tshisekedi's and Wamba Dia Wamba's
grievances regarding Kabila's dictatorship, corruption, nepotism and/or
the Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the
state-sponsored terrorism and/or xenophobia against the Banyamulenge,
clearly confirms Madison's assertion that:
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny" (James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 47,
p. 301).
That is to say, a careful interpretation of Tshisekedi's and Wamba
Dia Wamba's memorandums demonstrate that under Mzee's regime,
"Apres Mobutu = Avant Mobutu," -- Mobutu's "Onion system" lives!
That why, it is essential for Mzee Kabila to hear the
Congolese's cries, and creates a "Government of National Unity." If Mzee
have done this when he come to power on May 17, 1997, Museveni and Kagame
would not have succeeded with their evil aggression, which has plunged
thousands of Congolese families into a misery that eclipses even Mubutu's
legacy.
In light of Congolese sufferings, the "Government of National
Unity" must be a government constituted by technocrats i.e., innovative
citizens able to: a/ appreciate the strength of our ethnic diversity; b/
provide leadership through courage, discipline, honesty, modesty, and
vision; c/ cultivate friendly business environment, creating job
opportunities.
Further, it must be a government capable of creating an
interdisciplinary "Constitutional Taskforce" that will be in charge of
drafting the new constitution. This new Constitution must clearly
establish the principles of popular sovereignty, separation of power,
freedom and tolerance, proportional and equal representation, universal
suffrage, self-management of local entities, social & economic equality.
These principles are developed in my doctoral dissertation, entitled,
"Ethnicity and Modern Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Case of
Zaire: 1965-1995."
Finally, it must be a government capable of effectively preparing
local elections (i.e., elections of mayors for both urban and rural zones,
and their council members), provincial elections (i.e., elections of
governors and provincial council members), national elections (i.e.,
elections of member of the legislature), and finally, the organization of
a presidential election. The presidential election must come after the
stabilizing and the re-energizing of Congo's territorial management, and
not before.
As we can see, there exists no significant obstacle preventing
Mzee Kabila from establishing the "Government of National Unity." Kabila's
principal military allies: Edouardo Dos Santos, the Angola's President;
Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe's President, and Sam Nujoma, the Namibia's
President, will be Congolese's "Heroes," assuming they can convince Mzee
Kabila to materialize this Congolese dream of a fair and just society.
B. Militarily
As long as Museveni and Kagame continue to consider Congo's
territory their "battlefield," Uganda and Rwanda will never withdraw from
Congo.
The most effective way to militarily end Museveni's and Kagame's
terrorism, barbarism, and vandalism in Congo, is to convince Congo's
military allies, notably Dos Santos, Mugabe, and Nujoma, relocate the
battlefield to Uganda and Rwanda. This means that Kabila's allies must:
Primo, disregard United Nations, OAU, United States, France, Belgium and
other Western allies' opinions. We should take note that, if Congo's
military allies had listened to Western influences, then Uganda and Rwanda
would be ruling Kinshasa, today.
Secundo, give a firm ultimatum to Uganda and Rwanda to immediately
withdraw from Congo. Give them 48 hours.
Tercio, if Uganda and Rwanda ignore the allies' ultimatum, proceed
to a simultaneous air and ground attack of both Uganda's and Rwanda's
Capitols, and strategic military targets. After one or two days of combat
within Uganda and Rwanda, international powers, Uganda's and Rwanda's
people, will force Museveni and Kagame to withdraw their troops from
Congo. That will be the end of it! In the alternative, Museveni, Kagame,
and Tutsi extremists will never leave Congo. They are determined to fight
until their brothers rule Congo. Make no mistake about this.
When the bandit forces exit Congo, Kabila must establish the
"Government of National Unity," which will elevate Congo to a multi-party
democracy, and foster mutual forgiveness, philosophical tolerance,
national reconciliation, power sharing, and economic progress.
----------------------------------------
(1) See, Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba "Memorandum sur la Crise Congolaise" point
4, in Forum Congo2000, October 7, 1998; and also Etienne Tshisekedi wa
Mulumba, "Memorandum des Forces de L'Opposition Democratique de la RDC"
point A, in Fourm Congo2000, Setember22, 1998)
*NB: My second paper that will focus on the role of The United States and
its Western allies in the Congo's crisis still to come.Sloj S. Litofe |
|
