Dénonciation du plan de Museveni et ses alliés

Iruma Peter

Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Museveni and Kagame: Two Vicious Tribal Dictators, Sources of Instability in the Great Lakes Region By Sloj S. Litofe, Ph.D. candidate in Political Economy and Public Policy at the University of Southern California (USC)/Los Angeles, Silika@Almaak.usc.edu, September 19, 1998, USA Since August 2, 1998, millions of Congolese have been once again victims of atrocities orchestrated by Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, and Paul Kagame, Vice President of Rwanda, two Tutsi Machiavellian leaders, real sources of insecurity, political instability, and savage killings that are still going on in the Great Lakes Region. Though today the Democratic Republic of Congo's (former Zaire) crisis may have several indirect causes (local, national, regional, and international), I would like to exclusively focus on what I consider being its direct cause, namely: Museveni and Kagame's ambition to create a Tutsi political dynasty in the Great Lakes Region. I will conclude with recommendations for Congolese President Laurent Kabila to establish due process, liberal politics, and a viable socioeconomic foundation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is important to anyone interested in the peace, security, stability and economic progress of the Great Lakes Region to be aware of the following facts summarized in ten basic points. 1. From November 24, 1965 to May 17, 1997 the late Mobutu Sese Seko, the United States and Western's protg in Central Africa, established in the Democratic Republic of Congo an "onion system", and ran it as a private property. I call Mobutu's regime an "onion system" because the survival mechanisms that he developed metaphorically resembled a vegetable onion where all powers were concentrated in his hands, leaving little or zero autonomy of initiatives and actions to the provincial and local authorities (see, Articles 35 and 36 of the August 15, 1974 Constitution as modified by the law # 80/012 of November 15, 1980). Given this reality, when the Banyamulenge's rebellion broke out in mid-October 1996, Congolese as well as Mobutu's backers (notably the United States and most of its Western allies) were already fed up with his corrupt "onion system", and his reluctance to introduce democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. From this standpoint, the support (i.e., moral, political, financial and military) given to Laurent Desire Kabila (Mobutu's successor) by Congolese as well as by foreign governments, notably those of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania and, most importantly, the United States, had a common goal: To get rid of Mobutu and his corrupt "onion system". 2. However, this obsession of getting rid of the dictator (Mobutu) made many Congolese as well as several members of international community --consciously and/or unconsciously -- overlook the real issue at stake in the Great Lakes Region namely: Museveni and Kagame's conspiracy to create a Tutsi Dynasty in the Great Lakes Region (see, Remigius Kintu, "Who are behind the Rwanda Crisis? UDC Inc., April 12, 1994; Aschiller Institute's Uwe Friesecke, "Britain's Deadly Game of Geopolitics and Genocide in Africa", in The New Federalist, Volume XI, No. 7, February 19, 1997, p.5; Linda de Hoyo, "US warns Museveni, London's Puppet in Africa", in The New Federalist, op.cit. p. 9). My contention here is that, although it is well known that Tutsi of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi do not necessarily constitute a "coherent bloc", and thus have distinct interests, Congolese as well as foreign governments who adroitly helped Kabila and the Banyamulenge to get rid of Mobutu, consciously and/or unconsciously helped Museveni and Kagame to further advance their tribal hegemonic ambition. Indeed, the fact that Lt. Gen. Yoweri Museveni, a Tutsi, is President of Uganda; Major Gen. Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, and a former Uganda's head of Military Intelligence, is today Vice President, Defense Minister, Commander in Chief of Rwanda's Army, the de facto President of Rwanda; Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, is President of Burundi; and that James Kabarehe, an officer of Uganda's Army who until his demotion in mid- July 1998, controlled Kabila's Army, Deo-Gratias Bugera, a Tutsi, who until Kabila's cabinet reshuffling of June 12, 1998 chaired Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL)1, and Bizima Karaha, a Tutsi, veterinary doctor and Kagame's close relative with no experience in Foreign Affairs who, until his defection to join the Banyamulenge's II rebellion, was the minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo's-- these facts together are not "incidents de parcours". There are the materialization of a premeditated and well-executed ethnic plot. In fact, a reading of Uganda's recent history tells us that on January 29, 1986, Lt. Gen. Yoweri Museveni, a Tutsi, former defense minister of President Yusuf K. Lule and co-founder of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA), took power in Uganda following the overthrow of Lt. Gen. Tito Okello on January 27, 1986. During his guerrilla campaign against Lt.Gen. Tito Okello, Museveni was primarily helped by Tutsi fighters from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and the former Zaire. As a payback recognition to Rwandan Tutsi fighters, Museveni embarked himself in helping these Rwandan Tutsi fighters to re-conquer power that Tutsis have lost in Rwanda since Hutu's bloody revolt that caused the overthrow of Tutsi feudal monarchy in November 1959. Hence, on October 1, 1990, with Museveni blessing, the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) which later became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), under the direction of Major-General Rwingema, invaded Rwanda from Uganda (see, Remigius Kintu, "Who are behind the Rwanda Crisis? UDC Inc., April 12, 1994). Thousands of Rwandans, Hutus and Tutsis alike, were killed. Women were raped, and several villages and crops in northern Rwanda were destroyed. Since than the Tutsi-dominated RPF have on several occasions attempted to re-conquer power in Rwanda. But, in each of these occasions there were defeated by Rwanda's Armed Forces (FAR) logistically supported by French and Belgian, and militarily by Zairian troops (Arthur S. Bank & Al., 1994-95, pp.737-8). In fact, Mobutu's support to Hutus in both Rwanda and Burundi was not a secret, and Tutsi hard-liners never forgot it. On November 3, 1990, Major-General Rwigyema was killed. After his death, Major Paul Kagame took over the RPF. Since than, the RPF intensified its raids on Rwanda, forcing President Juvenal Habyarimana to accelerate Rwanda's peace process. On April 6, 1994 while on their way back to Kigali after the Arusha's peace talks summit in Tanzania, presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Sylvestre Ntaryamire of Burundi, two Hutu's leaders were killed. Although their assassination still remains an enigma for many common Rwandans, according to Hutu hard-liners, their plane was gunned down by elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) dominated by Tutsi ethnic group. Taking into account this conviction, Hutu militants led by Rwandan Presidential Guards and the Hutu's extremist coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) militia went on rampage, savagely slaughtering over 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This genocide drew worldwide condemnations. Hutu extremists were portrayed as barbarous and savage. Tutsis were considered as innocent victims. Hutu extremists alienated most of their internal and international support, and lost power in Rwanda. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was installed to power on July 19, 1994; and Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, become Vice president, defense minister, and commander in chief of Rwanda's Army. Over two millions Hutus sought refuge in The Democratic Republic of Congo in the Ruzizi plane, as well as the cities of Uvira, Bukavu, and Goma. In the meantime, on October 1997, the Burundian President Sylvestre Ntibatunganya (a hutu, who became acting President on April 8,1994 by virtue of his presidency of the National Assembly, following the death of Cyprien Ntayamire on April 6, 1994) was overthrown by Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi. As a result, we have Museveni, a Tutsi, President of Uganda; Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, Rwanda's strong man; and Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, and Burundi's strong man. In order to extend their ethnic hegemony in the Democratic Republic of Congo and take advantage of its numerous natural resources, Museveni and Kagame, under the double claims of first driving out Hutu genocide perpetrators who had been using the refugee camps inside the Democratic Republic of Congo to launch attacks against Rwanda; and secondly that of helping the Banyamulenge defend themselves against the deputy governor of South Kivu province whom since October 7, 1996, had ordered them to leave Congo; otherwise they will be hunted dawn as rebels; Museveni and Kagame armed the Banyamulenge and incited them to rebel against Kivu's authorities. Kagame's revelations in Washington Post Edition of July 9, 1997 claiming that "Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) planned and led the rebels against Mobutu" testify to this. On October 21, 1996, the Banyamulenge's rebellion became a reality. However, given the cold reception reserved to the Banyamulenge's rebellion by other Democratic Republic of Congo's local ethnic groups (i.e., the Bashi, the Hunde, the Nande, the Wangilima, the Nyanga and Rega), who were very suspicious of the Banyamulenge's direct connections with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, Museveni and Kagame decided to give the Banyamulenge's rebellion a national image. Laurent Desire Kabila, a Katangese and a long friend of Museveni and Kagame, and a long time military opponent to Mobutu's regime was then selected by Museveni and Kagame to be the figurehead of the Banyamulenge's rebellion. That is, Laurent Desire Kabila appeared on the scene only after the Banyamilege's rebellion was well-launched and when Museveni and Kagame felt the necessity of a non Tutsi face at the head of it (see, David Aronson, "Kabila's Tutsi Connection", Clarinet News, July 7, 1997). Basically, to Museveni and Kagame, Kabila was the right man to be in the Democratic Republic of Congo, what Pasteur Bi After seven months of an effortless offensive --because Mobutu's unpaid and demoralized troops refused to fight, instead fleeing and looting town after town before the rebels arrived-- the rebellion gained the upper hand. On May 17, Kabila succeeded to become the self-proclaimed President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and gave himself wide powers to govern without a legislature until a time when a new constitution would be adopted. Mobutu Sese Seko, who left the Congo on May 16, after being abandoned by all his former external allies, except King Hassan II of Morocco, died in Rabat on September 7, 1997 where he was in exile. 3. Nonetheless, from May 17, 1997 --a date that consecrating the fall of Kinshasa-- to June 2, 1998 (the date marking the demotion of Deogratias Bugera as the General Secretary of the ADFL, followed by the sacking of James Kabarehe as Kabila's Army interim chief of staff in mid-July 1998, and ultimately, Kabila's decision to expel from the Congo all Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers), in reality, President Kabila did not have any real power. Kabarehe, who controlled Kabila's Army, Bugera, who chaired Kabila's ADFL, and Karaha, the veterinarian who, until his defection on mid-August 1998 to join the Banyamulenge's II rebellion, was Kabila's minister of foreign affairs, had the real say in the politics of Congo. Museveni's declaration according to which "Kabila was not the chief of the ADFL" (see, Le Soft www.10 Juillet 1997, p.2), and Kagame's revelations in Washington Post Edition of July 9, 1997 claiming that "Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) planned and led the rebels against Mobutu" confirm this. Further, it is no secret that it was Karaha and his Ugandan and Rwandan partners who made it hard for Kabila to cooperate with the United Nations investigations on the massacre and/or genocide of over 230,000 Hutu refugees during the ADFL offensive in the Congo (see, Karuhanga K. Chapaa, "Kabila is a survivor!", in AfricaNews, September 2, 1998). It is also well known that it was Karaha who refused to receive the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the special envoy of President Bill Clinton to Africa. It is also well known that Karaha and Bugera were among Kabila's entourage who were very instrumental in Kabila's decision to relegate opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi to his native village, to shut down the activities of opposition political parties, and to systematically arrest their leaders. 4. Museveni and Kagame's declarations, as well as the control of the Democratic Republic of Congo's Army, Foreign Affairs, and Kabila's ADFL by three Tutsis who have strong ties with Museveni and Kagame, made many Congolese people develop four principal confirmed beliefs. First, President Kabila --a native Congolese-- was simply a "puppet" placed by the Tutsis as a symbolic Head of the Democratic Republic of Congo to cover up Museveni and Kagame's tribal ambitions, in the same way Rwanda's President Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, is covering them in Rwanda. Second, although Kagame's revelations of July 9, 1997 claiming that "Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) planned and led the rebels against Mobutu" did not surprise those who attentively follow what is currently going on in the Great Lakes Region, they nonetheless constituted a wake-up call to most Congolese patriots who increasingly believed that the Democratic Republic of Congo was occupied and ruled by foreign forces. Third, Kabila's decision to finally let the United Nations Human Rights Commission investigate the Hutu massacres by the Tutsis continues to irritate Museveni and Kagame. Why? Simply because if these investigations went through as planned, they could surely establish that "Tutsis" are not simply innocent victims as Museveni and Kagame want the international community to believe; instead, they are also criminals just like their Hutu compatriots. Such a conclusion could seriously soften the international community's indignation vis--vis Hutu hard-liners behind the 1994 genocide and, subsequently, eroding world sympathy toward the Tutsis, and thus undercut Museveni's and Kagame's tribal ambitions in the Great Lakes Region. Fourth, if one digs deeper into the Tutsi-Hutu saga, one will discover that the Tutsi extremists are the real cause of savage killings that are still going on in the Great Lakes Region. Why? The reason can be found in their belief reinforced by anthropologists dating back to pre-colonial and colonial times that: "The Tutsis were born to rule, the Hutus to farm, and the Twas (Pygmies) to serve both the Tutsis and Hutus." 2 These stereotypes, prevalent in pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi, were exacerbated during the colonial era. For instance, under colonial rule, only Tutsis could become soldiers or be appointed to serve in government. Moreover, as Jacques Maquet pointed out: "In 1956, there was in Rwanda not a single Hutu 'chief ' out of 46 and not a single Hutu 'subchief ' out of 603" (see, Jacques Maquet, "Societal and Cultural Incorporation in Rwanda", in Ronald Cohen & John Middleton, 1970, p.214). The revitalization of these stereotypes by Museveni and Kagame, two Machiavellian leaders; and the resistance opposed to them by Hutu extremist leaders constitute "une chaine sans fin", a vicious circle that will continue to ravage the Great Lakes Region in general and Rwanda and Burundi in particular. To me, as long as the stereotypes on Tutsis, Hutus, and Twas continue to be activated by Machiavellian Tutsi leaders like Museveni and Kagame, extremist Hutus will retaliate, and the vicious circle of savage killing will continue. Land scarcity, overpopulation, and migration, Uganda and Rwanda's malicious idea of creating a buffer zone within the Democratic Republic of Congo to "so-called" protect their strategic interests, the state-sponsored terrorism and xenophobia against the Banyamulenge, Kabila's dictatorship, corruption, and nepotism and/or Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo, are only secondary causes of today's Congo crisis. 5. Aware of the Congolese' four assumptions on the Tusis' role in Congo, Kabila started his own survival game by systematically neutralizing Musevini's and Kagame's antennas in the Congo, and thus, reinforcing his power and independence. Kabila's tactical decision to join the Southern Africa Development Communities (SADC), the demotion of Bugera as the General Secretary of the ADFL, that of Kabarehe in his position as Congo's interim chief of staff, and Kabila's ultimate decision to expel from Congo all Rwandan and Ugandan troops must be viewed as Kabila's effort to consolidate his power and secure his independence vis--vis Museveni and Kagame. 6. Given the foregoing considerations, it became clear to Museveni and Kagame that Kabila was no longer "the right man in the right place". Consequently, he had to go. Thus, the fabrication of the so-called Banyamulenge's II rebellion of August 2, 1998. This so-called Bayamulenge's II rebellion is not a rebellion, but, a well planned invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo --a sovereign United Nations member-- by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in order to get rid of President Kabila 3. 7. When they started this so-called Banyamulenge's II rebellion, Museveni and Kagame had two strategies in mind. The first one was that, as soon as the rebellion started, proclaim the "Republique Autonome du Sud Kivu" -that is, an indirect annexation of one of Congo's most resourceful provinces. By doing so, Museveni and Kagame thought that the rest of Congo would embarked in "a domino effect" of a series of secessions with several military leaders governing each province. The Democratic Republic of Congo would then disintegrate; leaving Kivu at the mercy of Uganda and Rwanda who could annex it to their projected confederation of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. This Tutsi extremists' ambition to annex the Province of Kivu is well described by a group of Kivu's intellectuals in these terms: "Cher Peuple Bukavien, Apres analyse de la situation qui prevaut a l'Est de notre pays, Nous, membres d'un groupe de reflexion, 1. Considerant l'histoire meme du peuple Tutsi, expulse de l'Egypte pour avoir voulu renverser la Dynastie du Roi Pharaon, 2. Considerant les declarations du President Rwandais juste avant la guerre, declarations selon lesquelles il revendiquait l'ancien Kivu comme etant un territoire Rwandais (en demandant la tenue de Berlin II pour revoir les frontieres) 3. Convaincus que la guerre nous est imposee par les Tutsis du Rwanda, Burundi, et Uganda, est une guerre de conquetes de notre territoire, 4. Convaincus que les Tutsis sont en quete d'un territoire a occuper, 5. Persuades qu'il s'agit d'une recolonisation du peuple Zairois et non d'une liberation, 6. Persuades que la tribu Banyamilegue n'existe pas parmi le plus de 450 tribus que comptent le Zaire, d'apres l'histoire ethnologique et qu'il s'agit tout simplement d'un peuple Tutsi transplante de nos pays voisins et vivant sur le territoire Zairois comme etranger, 7. Considerant l'assujetissement et l'humiliation dans laquelle nous sommes plonges actuellement (gouverneur sans pouvoir, occupation des postes politico-administratifs, l'armee du FPR, bastonnade, viol, pillage, enlevement) 8. u les consequences nefastes qui se pointent a l'horizon, et par ces motifs, Creons a Bukavu le "FRONT DE LUTTE CONTRE L'OCCUPATION TUTSI" en sigle "FLOT", mouvement qui se fixe comme objectif l'opposition d'une resistance contre l'expension, l'occupation, et la domination Tutsi, Invitons nos populations a prendre conscience et soutenir le mouvement" (see, Goma/Bukavu: Temoignage Direct, Janvier 1997, pp.18-19). As it can be observed, the intellectuals of Kivu are well aware of Museveni and Kagame's determination to annex Kivu. Unfortunately for Museveni and Kagame, Congolese nationalism, supported by Kabila and support from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia prove them wrong. 8. Faced with the fiasco of their first strategy, Museveni and Kagame are now resorting to their second strategy. This one consists of presenting the Banyamulenge's II rebellion as a national insurrection against Kabila's government. To do so, they resurrected the same tactics used to overthrow Mobutu on May 17, 1997 namely: Fool the Congolese people and the international community by placing well known Congolese faces in the front page of the so-called Banyamulenge's II rebellion, and let Museveni, Kagame, Kabarehe, Karaha, Bugera, Moise Nyarugabo and their external lobbies play the behind the scene cards. Museveni, Kagame, Kabarehe, Karaha, Bugera, and Nyarugabo are the real masterminds of today's Congo crisis. Congolese participants, poor Professor Wamba dia Wamba, and his "collabos", notably Mr. Arthur Zaidi Ngoma, Tambwe Mwamba, Lunda Bululu, Jean Pierre Ondekane and many others --despite their legitimate grievances regarding Kabila's dictatorship, corruption, and nepotism and/or the Katanganization of the Democratic Republic of Congo-- are just naively being used by Museveni and Kagame. Sooner or later these compatriots will discover Museveni and Kagame's diabolic game in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In fact it suffices that any anyone interested in the peace, security, stability and economic progress of the Great Lakes Region to ask himself the following questions in order to discover Museveni and Kagame's strategy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A. Who are the real instigators of the so-called the Democratic Republic of Congo Banyamulenge's II rebellion of August 2, 1998? And, who are finding and supplying them with guns and ammunitions? B. Why is it that expelling Ugandan and Rwandan's troops, and not the Banyamulenge --who themselves claim to be Congolese and not Ugandans or Rwandans-- must plunge the Democratic Republic of Congo in a senseless war, killing thousands of their own, destroying their properties, and raping their own mothers, sisters and daughters? C. What strategic and/or security interests do Uganda and Rwanda have in South-West Congo that could justify the presence of their troops in Inga, Boma, Kitona and Matadi? In other words, how many guerrilla warfare members of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) launched against Uganda from Inga, Boma, Kitona and Matadi that could justify the presence of Uganda's troops in these towns? Why do these fears not extend to Sudan, where Ugandan opposition movements are stationed? D. Why is it that despite clear evidence of the presence of Uganda and Rwanda's troops in Congo's eastern town of Goma, Bukavu, Uvira, as well as several Uganda and Rwanda's soldiers captured as POWs by Kabila's coalition army; Museveni and Kagame continue to ridicule themselves by continuing to deny their presence in these towns? Why this hypocrisy? And, what is behind it? E. Why is it that Museveni and Kagame are diplomatically very isolated, while Kabila, who they portrayed as a poor leader, a drunker, etc., has successfully succeeded to mobilize several African leaders to his cause? F. How did Museveni and Kagame, who claim to be symbol of democratic leaders in the Great Lakes Region, come to power? Did they come to power by democracy? If not, under what authority must Museveni and Kagame dictate to the Congolese people how they should run their country? 9. Congolese must solve the Democratic Republic of Congo's problems themselves. However, I strongly commend presidents Mugabe, Edouardo Dos Santos and Sam Nujoma, for their courageous initiative of militarily assisting the Congolese people and their President arrest Museveni and Kagame's diabolic plot in the Great Lakes Region. Indeed, as these two military leaders only understand the language of guns and violence, the best way to destroy their vicious tribal plot against the innocent people of the Democratic Republic of Congo is, unfortunately, to use military force: "Those that live by the sword die by the sword". This is the only language that Museveni and Kagame seem to understand. 10. However, once these two aggressors are completely neutralized, it is imperative that President Kabila has the courage and the modesty to convoke a "National Round Table" to discuss the following: In the short term (1 to 2 Years) (a) Strongly reaffirm the OAU charter and in particular the Cairo Declaration of the 1964 on "Territorial Inviolability of National boundaries as inherited at independence", and strongly denounce and combat any strategy aiming to circumvent it. (b) Learn from Mandela and De Klerk's spirits. In fact, Nelson Mandela, the world's longest political prisoner, upon his liberation from prison, instead of adopting "La Lois d'Italion" which emphasizes the maxim of "eye for eye and tooth for tooth"; Mandela preached pardon, national reconciliation, national unity, tolerance, and extended his hands to all South Africa's political factions and forces in order to build a democratic South Africa. The fact that he appointed former apartheid President, F.W. De Klerk, as one of his two deputy Presidents, and his former rival Mr. Buthelezi (champion of tribal and ethnic massacres in South Africa) as Minister of Home Affairs, testify to this. Several of Africa's scholars and political opposition lack "Mandela's spirit". Indeed, it suffices that a given African political opponent be thrown in jail for a couples hours by a given acting regime --this does not means that the given regime has the right to do so-- in order to be automatically turned into a "political monster", rigid to any spirit of forgiveness, national reconciliation and compromise. Basically, most African opposition leaders and their clients should be able to understand that they will never succeed to help African people effectively foster economic development and improve their living standard by revitalizing ethnic rivalries and preaching the "spirit of retaliation and revenge". In addition, to "Mandela's spirit", African leaders need to cultivate "De Klerk's spirit". In fact, F.W.De Klerk, the former white President in power during the apartheid regime, knew that being a member of the white minority, ceteris paribus, there was no way that he could remain in power once South Africa included the black majority, as "one man, one vote". Nonetheless, despite this reality, F.W. De Klerk courageously accepted to embark his country on democratic reform. Some critics might argue that F.W. De Klerk did not have the choice given the international pressures and especially those exercised on his regime by the United States. While this argument might be true, these critics should remember that many African dictators experiencing even more pressures that those of Mr. F.W. De Klerk, prefer to be savagely killed as in the cases of Samuel Doe of Liberia and Mohamed Abdallah of Comoro Island, or plunge their countries in "human tragedy" as in the cases of Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Angola and Sudan; than to take the process of peaceful democratic reform and national reconciliation. (c) In light of Mandela's and De Klerk's spirits, Kabila should also create a "Government for the People" which means, a government of national unity incorporating all fragments of the Democratic Republic of Congo's civil society, a government constituted by technocrats i.e., people capable of innovating practical ways and strategies of tackling the country's urgent problems. (d) Rehabilitate the Democratic Republic of Congo's Civil Services by taking appropriate actions on human resources, infrastructure, and methods and processes. The rehabilitation of Congo's bureaucracy implies that immediate actions be undertaken by the ministry of civil service in order to resolve the litigation that have been accumulating with regard to salaries, family and promotion benefits. There is no doubt that the financial compensation given to an employee for his work in the public services constitutes the first motivating stimulus in which the government can rely to ensure the loyalty and devotion of the employee. However, as it is difficult to establish with clarity the maximal and minimal threshold beyond which the financial advantages can provide the attachment and the identification of public employees, the important thing in this matter is not so much the nominal amount to earn, but the regularity with which the salaries and family benefits are obtained and their exact matching with the administrative situation (i.e. grade, seniority, diploma) and the family situation (number of children) of the employee. That is why particular attention must be given to the regularization of the litigation with respect to salaries, family allocations and promotion benefits. The physical control initiated since October 15, 1985, throughout the public services has revealed the nature of the problems related to this matter: re-routing of salaries for an unknown address, blocking of salaries for current employees, payment of ghost employees, deserters or deceased, disregard of children an employee is legally responsible for in calculating the minimal salary which would correspond to the real grade, several years of career spent in the same grade, etc. (e) Rehabilitate the "Portefeuil de la Republique". This means, a redynamization of Public enterprises by initiating their effective privatization, and securing the affectation of the right people (i.e., the right Presidents Deleges Generaux) at the right places (i.e., the appropriate Public Enterprises). (f) Create an interdisciplinary "Constitutional Taskforce" that will be in charge of drafting the new constitution. This new Constitution must clearly establish the principles of popular sovereignty, separation of power, freedom and tolerance, proportional and equal representation, universal suffrage, self-management of local entities, social & economic equality. (g) Political liberalization: Lift the ban on political parties, freedom of speech, religion, and association; and consolidate the second generation of bill of rights (i.e. the right to employment, nutrition, education, safety, a healthy environment, etc) (h) Revitalize the Democratic Republic of Congo's diplomatic relations with the United States, France, and Belgium; and consolidate its relations with regional and international institutions. In Medium term (2 to 3 years) (a) Reorganize the Democratic Republic of Congo's Territorial Management (i.e., election of governors, provincial councils, mayors of urban and rural zones, etc). (b) Rebuild the Democratic Republic of Congo's army. Make it a body of "professionals", ready to establish and maintain internal peace, to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country, and to defend it against external aggression. Special troops (i.e., a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated commando) in charge of supervising the Congo's frontiers with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi must be organized. The presence of Banyamulenge's soldiers in the towns of Bukavu, Goma, Uvira, and Kalemie must be sensibly reduced so that they are more evenly represented throughout the country as opposed to a particular region. Museveni and Kagame must be neutralized by all means necessary. Indeed, make no mistake about it; these military leaders are very determined to control the Democratic Republic of Congo. (c) Make an inventory of all damages done by Museveni's and Kagame's troops in the Congo, and make Museveni and Kagame pay the bill. The Democratic Republic of Congo must seek the cooperation of the Organization of Africa Unity and the United Nations in this matter. In Long Run (3 to 5 year maximum) In three to five years, the following must take place in Congo: (a) Legislative election, (b) Presidential election, (c) Creation of an autonomous "Supreme Court of Justice" in charge of securing the strict respect of the constitution and the application of laws in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The details of some of these propositions are well described in my Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Ethnicity and Modern Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Case of Zaire: 1965-1995. 1. ADFL is a coalition created on October 18, 1996 grouping four major political formations notably: the People's Democratic Alliance (ADP) of Deogratias Bugera, the National Resistance Council for Democracy (CNRD) of Andre Kisase Ngandu, the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire (RLZ) of Masasu Nidaga, and the People's Revolution Party (PRP) of Laurent Desire Kabila. 2. (See, in this matter the description of Tutsis, Hutus, and Twas by Derkeren Gaston, Atlas du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Elsevier, Paris- Bruxelles, 1955, p. 66). 3. In my second paper, special attention will be given to the role of The United States and its Western allies in the Congo crisis. Iruma Peter