The SA army, notwithstanding government rhetoric and Mandela's [the professional conciliator ]vision of a "rainbow" nation, real power still rests in South Africa in the hands of the white minority. And despite all this talk of reconciliation and democracy and forgiveness and "South Africa for all South Africans"the whites are still a much-hated and feared minority. So when the people of Lesotho see the South African army coming to "restore order" in their kingdom, despite the large number of Africans in that intervention force, they see behind it all the still-entrenched power of White South Africa, coming to thwart their dreams. Their rage should be understandable. Memories are long in Africa, contrary to popular misconceptions and the Basuto remember a long and often acrimonious relationship with the giant in whose sea they swim. The kingdom of Lesotho was founded when the Basuto fled to escape the encroaching Boers and warring Zulus. In this century in the apartheid years, the white government engineered a coup against Lebua Jonathan whose government supported and gave sanctuary to ANC guerillas fighting apartheid. On various occasions the apartheid government sent commandos against the kingdom, assassinated and blockaded the tiny kingdom to bend it to its will. Despite the ostensible change of government in South Africa from white to African, the interior structure and centre of power still remain in white hands and perhaps the cabal that intervened in the region to crush dissent in the apartheid years is still the driving engine in the South African armed forces. There was an election and the Mosilsili Pakalitha government was elected with 79 of 80 seats under very dubious circumstances. There were definitely some irregularities in the election as observed by the SADC commission that investigated but stopped short of outright condemnation.. The report was delayed, too long to appease the opposition which felt justifiably cheated. Increasing protests prompted the South Africans to intervene, probably heeding the advice of the still potent apartheid era security mechanism. It is interesting to note that action was taken by Buthelezi Mangosuthu whose ties with the apartheid-era power structure are very strong. While Mandela is abroad receiving the accolades of the West for keeping the simmering wrath of his people under tight control, flashing his Cheshire cat grin and blessing the adulterous and mendacious US President, his tiny neighbour is subjected to the clumsy might of the South African army. South African relations with the rest of the Continent in the post-apartheid era have been characterized by clumsy, ineffective interaction. This is based on a certain lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of Africa. After four years, South Africa has not Africanized herself. With a few changes, among them the obvious cosmetics of business-suited African government leaders and African faces at the head of white structures, the status quo of the apartheid years is still very much intact. No one is fooled. South African policy failures in the region are a direct result of this very obvious perception. No matter the colour of the troops, the Basuto still see the old SA army invading them. During the war against Mobutu and the more recent invasion of Congo by Rwanda-Uganda forces SA diplomatic efforts were viewed with a certain circumspection as if one were dealing with an almost-healed, yet still potentially offensive leper. The Africans who are supposed to be ruling South Africa have not truly come to terms with the gigantic problems facing them. They have not vigorously attempted to address the needs of the seething African majority for whom the change of government has not brought much change. What will happen when Mandela goes as he inevitably must? Will his inheritors in the name of big business opt for "law and order" with the inevitable consequences for the peace of the country? Will they place themselves in the position of denying the undeniable black voice? The liberation struggle in South Africa was markedly different from that of Zimbabwe. Angola, Mocambique and Namibia. The movement in South Africa appeared to be built around icons: Mandela, grown to larger-than-life while imprisoned, the Union leaders, Bishop Tutu, Oliver Tambo, Kris Hani, while mass protests occurred in the streets. Actual combat was relegated to the odd running gun battle, blowing up of empty buildings. Circumstances did not permit the kind of grinding guerilla warfare which occurred in the other countries which permitted the growth of a true liberation culture that could be transferred to a post-liberation society. This is not to diminish the South African liberation struggle, but to underline its complexity and difference. This is a difference that has translated into a post-liberation variance with the rest of the guerilla armies of the region. There have been no massive societal and structural changes in post-apartheid South Africa. Monuments to Boer dominion and degradation of Africans still stand and there has been no reversion to African names. It is important for Africans after 300 years of oppression to be able to reclaim their heritage. South Africa was to be renamed Azania,

What ever happened to that? Monuments showing the Boer invaders trampling the Zulu beneath their feet still stand. Rural South Africa is still under the thumb of the brutal Boer farmer who treats his African workers like slaves. Recently one farmer shot two African children who were crossing his field killing a baby the older child was carrying on her back. The racist mentality persists. White farms are under attack and some 500 farmers have been killed, probably by Africans who have decided to exact their own retribution. There is a seething undercurrent of anger, disenchantment and frustration beneath the surface in the African population waiting for a spark, giving the lie to the blithe assurances of African "forgiveness" and "generosity". It is against this volatile backdrop South Africa chose to intervene in an internal conflict between a government of dubious legitimacy and an opposition that felt cheated of its democratic right. Is it any wonder that the Basuto reacted with such ferocity? Will anyone be surprised if South Africa finds herself stuck with a thorn she cannot draw? There are changes evolving rapidly in the whole southern half of Africa: ideological shifts, political and economic realignments, military alliances which will impact powerfully on the Continent's future. The fulcrum of this movement is the Congo, whose government has charted a nationalist, independent direction which is fast moving to an internationalist position. Kabila is traveling the Continent building bridges, securing support, winning friends and influencing people. South Africa looks like a guest who has to wait in the courtyard while the others are setting the table in the dining room. Rwanda and Uganda for all intents and purposes are not even in the courtyard but are standing beyond the fence. Since the invasion of the Congo began on August 2, 1998 neither Rwanda or Uganda has won any African allies to their cause.

The blatant attempt to smear the Kabila ADFL government by linking them to the Interhamwe rebels and anti-Uganda rebels with all the connotations of genocide and massacre is a dangerous short and long-term policy. The Congo people see themselves at war with Uganda and Rwanda and will back morally, if not materially any force that aligns against them. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Any outside force that intervenes under the pretext of forestalling "genocide" will face the wrath and undying hatred of the Congo people [and this means the US if she decides to intervene militarily]. As I iterated before the only sensible path is for the Rwandans and Ugandans to swallow their bile and make vigorous attempts to secure some form of ironclad guarantees for the minority Tutsi people. There are minority peoples all over Africa and none have claimed this special status Rwanda's leaders seek for themselves. Rwanda keeps tilling the soil of community violence from which they cannot benefit. No matter what anyone says about Rwanda's military skill, she is not 19th century Prussia. She will be surrounded by an increasingly hostile sea. And putting minority rights before that of the majority is not only dangerous and precedent-setting, no African nation [most of which have a complex mix of minorities] will endorse such a system. Any outside [read Western] intervention pushing the interests of the Tutsi will create conditions where the Tutsi will become the Untouchables of the Continent. The only solution the Rwandans have is negotiation-- now not later while they still have the chance. Even if all the Interhamwe were driven out of the Congo today, the Rwandan Government will still have to deal with them, one way or the other. Better sooner than later. So it all ties in. African countries, thanks to the conditions created by the invasion of the Congo will be forced to look at themselves collectively and to work in blocs seeking indigenous solutions to indigenous problems. The impact of Western intervention has lessened considerably since the fiasco of US intervention in Somalia. Any direct or indirect intervention in the region's evolving political landscape will create a wellspring of animosity against the West. The Cold war is over and the West can be seen for what it is- a bloc that pursues its own interests and not necessarily to the benefit of developing countries. The legacy of failed Western aid initiatives, much of which has done little to improve or alter the conditions of the African common people, the arrogance of Western aid "experts" in Africa who behave as if they are on one long extended vacation and in many cases treat the Africans with undisguised contempt, this legacy has been noted and will not be forgotten. African nationalism long confused in the ideological chaos of the Cold War is reemerging with clearer focus. The assistance that the ADFL government received from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe is a direct result of Kabila's invocation of this nationalism. The West which had positioned forces of intervention across the river in Brazzaville were seen as inimical to this renascent nationalism, for their history has been always one of intervening for their interests and not those of the people on whose behalf they were supposed to have intervened. Given the West's antipathy to the Kabila government, there should be not doubt on whose side they would have placed their forces and Kabila's appeal to his friends who are strong African nationalists has thwarted what could have been a very, very nasty situation for the Congo people. Conversely, South Africa's intervention places it on the opposite side of the spectrum: supporting a government of dubious legitimacy against a popular reaction to what is perceived as a cheated vote. African people are weighing and analyzing the differences and contradictions and sifting through the information and eventually the SA intervention will be looked at in unfavorable light. South Africa has armed Rwanda and is technically allied to that regime. Rwanda and Uganda are at least regarded with skepticism and at worst will be relegated to pariah status in the Region. If the United States as suggested in NCN [25 September] affixes the label of "rogue state" to the DRC with all that connotes, and is seen to intervene, she risks provoking an African nationalist backlash, and anti-Americanism in Africa in this epoch will create a very volatile situation on the Continent. Any benefits accruing to the US from Clinton's 1997 visit [already tenuous considering that the focus of his visit was Rwanda and Uganda] will vanish like so much stale smoke. The Soviet Union is no longer around to confuse and complicate things and if the US resumes the gendarme role directly or indirectly in the region she will feed the fires of nationalism. There are those who tritely will say: African nationalism? Who needs it? After all, isn't the Soviet Union dead and isn't this all a bunch of leftist Cold war rhetoric? Wrong. Before the Soviet Union and leftist Cold war rhetoric, there was nationalism. It is one of man's oldest philosophies and if the Africans will be a nation, a pan-African nation, they must have nationalism with all its connotations of good and evil. What must be clearly understood is the march to African liberation has never ceased. Mutations, setbacks, oversights, blunders, small triumphs but the march has never ceased. If one looks at what is happening in Africa as a series of political evolutions, sometimes cataclysmic, sometimes quiet and imperceptible but nevertheless, evolution, then much of what is happening on the Continent begins to make sense. One must cease trying to see Africa through the Western evolution model, which took time but as an African evolution on its own which is rapid, confusing and at times frustrating but ever-ongoing. There will be more changes, often violent for change in itself is seldom placid, but change will occur. How Africa shapes herself in the future depends on whether there will be external forces of intervention attempting to manipulate the outcome. Hopefully sane heads in the West will understand that Africa must find its own political way and that way might not necessarily be in the tracks the West have made.

George Dash